Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 19

Issue 3

Article 2

5-15-2019

The Advantages of Incorporating Mechanisms from the Salary
Arbitration Models of MLB and the NHL in a Salary Arbitration
System in MLS
Andrew Real

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Real, The Advantages of Incorporating Mechanisms from the Salary Arbitration Models of MLB
and the NHL in a Salary Arbitration System in MLS, 19 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 311 (2019)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol19/iss3/2

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Real: Salary Arbitration in Major League Soccer

The Advantages of Incorporating
Mechanisms from the Salary
Arbitration Models of MLB and the
NHL in a Salary Arbitration System in
MLS
Andrew Real*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will propose that Major League Soccer (”MLS” or “League”)
adopt a salary arbitration system similar to that used in both Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Hockey League (“NHL”).
In a professional sports context, salary arbitration is a system that is
implemented to settle salary disputes between a team and a player when salary
negotiations fail.1 Generally, such disputes are consequently submitted to
neutral arbitrators who weigh evidence of a player's performance, ability, and
leadership, in comparison with other players.2 The arbitrator will then
accordingly render a binding decision with respect to the amount of
compensation to which the player will be entitled.3
The NHL and MLB have such salary arbitration systems that afford
players the ability to obtain fair resolutions to their salary disputes.4 These
salary arbitration systems can confer a variety of benefits for players. For
example, the MLB’s salary arbitration system has become a significant factor
in driving player salaries upward because the system provides players with
additional leverage in settling contract disputes.5 Likewise, the NHL’s salary
arbitration system has been identified as a major contributing factor for the
“sudden explosion” of player salaries since 1990.6
Professional sports leagues that do not contain salary arbitration systems,
like the National Football League (“NFL”) and National Basketball
* B.S., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University
School of Law, 2019. The author would like to thank Professor Maureen Weston for her support of
the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal. The author would also like to thank his wife,
Watita Real, for her unwavering support during his legal education.
1
Mélanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap
Systems, 10 SPORTS L.J. 189, 191 (2003).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 193.
5
See Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball's Monetary Structure-Salary
Arbitration in its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
6
Stephen J. Bartlett, Contract Negotiations and Salary Arbitration in the NHL: An Agent's
View, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (1993).
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Association (“NBA”), often run into problems when disputes between players
and their teams over the renegotiation of player salaries arise.7 For example,
despite generating as much revenue as MLB and NHL combined,8 the average
salary of NFL players lags behind those leagues by $2.3 million and $800,000,
respectively.9
In 2016, MLS viewership surged to 25.7 million gross, with 55% of
viewers in the highly desirable eighteen to forty-nine year-old demographic;
live attendance ballooned to an average of 21,692 per game, behind only the
MLB and NFL.10
Moreover, youth soccer is one of the fastest growing sports in the United
States for both boys and girls.11 Around 3 million kids play in U.S. Youth
Soccer leagues, and “youth soccer participation doubles tackle football now[,]
and has over a million more kids than baseball.”12 Thus, it is evident that the
nation’s interest in soccer is the highest it has ever been.13
To keep this momentum rolling, MLS should emulate those strategies of
other professional leagues that have resulted in growth. The salary arbitration
model is one such advantageous strategy.
Part II of this article will provide a summary of the current salary
structures and mechanisms of MLS.14 Part II will also discuss the problems
and the origins of the problems associated with MLS's current salary
structures and mechanisms. Part III will summarize how salary arbitration is
utilized in MLB.15 Part III will additionally examine and recommend which
beneficial mechanisms of the MLB salary arbitration model should be
implemented in MLS. Part IV will summarize how salary arbitration is
utilized in the NHL. Part IV will also examine and recommend which
7
See, e.g., Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes: Implementing Salary
Arbitration in the National Basketball Association, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 38–44 (2011); see
also, e.g., Roger Quiles, A Solution to Holdouts in the National Football League: How Salary
Arbitration Can Limit a Growing Problem, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259, 263–66 (2011).
8
See Which Professional Sports Leagues Make the Most Money?, HOWMUCH.NET (July 1,
2016), https://howmuch.net/articles/sports-leagues-by-revenue.
9
Kurt Badenhausen, The Average Player Salary And Highest-Paid In NBA, MLB, NHL, NFL
And MLS, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2016, 9:34 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2016/12/15/average-player-salaries-in-majoramerican-sports-leagues/#565c26ce1050.
10
Mark J. Burns, MLS Records Banner Year In 2016, Cements Position Among Top U.S. Pro
Sports League, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2016, 9:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjburns/2016/10/26/mls-records-banner-year-in-2016-cementsposition-among-top-u-s-pro-sports-leagues/#757fc96278a2.
11
See Chris Demaria, What Are the Most Popular Youth Sports?, LIVESTRONG (Sept. 11,
2017), https://www.livestrong.com/article/99949-popular-youth-sports/.
12
Shane Paul Neil, Soccer Is Here, for Real This Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2016, 1:01
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shane-paul-neil/soccer-is-here-for-real-t_b_9730440.html
(concluding that “youth participation, health of its minor leagues, and valuations of its clubs show
that [soccer’s] rapid growth is both real and spectacular.”).
13
Id.
14
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Soccer and Major League Soccer
Players Union: February 1, 2015 – January 31, 2020 (detailing the current salary structure of MLS).
15
For an especially in-depth discussion on the mechanisms of the MLB and NHL, see Aubut,
supra note 1, at 201–12.
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beneficial mechanisms of the NHL salary arbitration model should be
implemented in MLS.16 Part V will anticipate and explain some of the
limitations and criticisms inherent to a potential MLS salary arbitration model.
Finally, part VI will conclude that the potential benefits of implementing the
proposed MLS salary arbitration model outweigh any potential limitations.
This article will center its arguments around the idea that a salary
arbitration system represents the development of a compensation system that
is more fair and equitable for its players. The development of such a system
will thereby allow MLS to continue its expansion as a major professional
sports league. However, it is important to note that this article does not intend
to propose and fully detail a wholly new and working MLS salary arbitration
system. Such a gargantuan task would be Sisyphean considering the
continually changing landscape of the expanding MLS. Rather, this article
aims to demonstrate how the implementation of specific, reasonable salary
arbitration mechanisms, appropriated from MLB and the NHL, can help the
exponentially growing MLS evade the mistakes of its older brothers.
II.

THE CURRENT SALARY SYSTEM OF MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, AND THE
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT SALARY SYSTEM.

A. The Current Salary System of MLS
Unlike other professional sports leagues in the United States, “it is [MLS],
and not the team owners, that determines where players play and how much
they’re paid.”17 The reasoning behind this unique League control is partly
historical. When MLS’s forefather, the North American Soccer League
(“NASL”), was originally founded, it was the country's top professional
circuit.18 The NASL failed largely because one of its teams, the Cosmos, paid
huge sums to sign stars like Pelé and Franz Beckenbauer, which set off
bidding wars that bankrupted rival teams.19
To avoid such a fate, MLS was structured as a single-entity, limited
liability corporation where the shareholders are the team owners.20 Therefore,
the League sets budgets to control player salaries, and controls allotment of
foreign-born players to teams.21

16
See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 45–52 (providing, in-depth, a similar discussion on the
implementation of a salary arbitration model into the structures of the NBA).
17
Aaron Elstein, Major League Soccer, Not Team Owners, Sets Players' Pay, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS. (Apr. 2, 2017, 12:01 AM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20170402/SMALLBIZ/170339971/major-league-soccer-notteam-owners-sets-players-pay. The league itself determines player salary “to a degree unequaled”
by the NBA, NHL, MLB, and even the NFL. See id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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B. Problems with MLS’s Current Salary System
Under the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which was
ratified July 16, 2015, MLS instituted a free agency system for the first time
in its history.22 While this represented a step forward for players, the free
agency system is extremely limited. Free agency applies only to players who
are twenty-eight years old, with at least eight years of experience in MLS, and
are below the maximum salary.23 Additionally, the CBA puts limits on how
much a free agent player’s new salary can increase.24 If a player is making
less than $100,000, then the increase is capped at 25%, if the player is making
$100,000 to $200,000, then the increase is capped at 20%, and if the player is
making more than $200,000, then the increase is capped at 15%.25
The limited nature of MLS’s current free agency system exemplifies
essentially only a symbolic, rather than financial, victory for the players.26 In
fact, there were a handful of anonymous quotes from players who were fully
prepared to strike for better terms, and all indications were that seven out of
the twenty clubs that participated in the negotiation voted against the
agreement.27 According to one anonymous player at the CBA negotiation,
“[p]layers are disappointed and upset with the union reps and Bob Foose.”28
The player continued, “[n]ot only did this deal destroy the future of the
American player, it barely helps the current group of players.”29
This frustration is understandable considering that the twenty-eight and
eight formula means only around 10% of current MLS players are eligible for
free agency.30 This means that 90% of players are stuck playing for the teams
the League tells them to play for at a salary dictated by the League without
negotiation or discussion.
Reflecting this frustration, a 2016 survey conducted by ESPN FC showed
that 84% of MLS players polled believed themselves to be underpaid
compared to the rest of the world.31 It is likely that this enormous response
22
MLSsoccer staff, MLS Players Union Announces that it has Ratified Collective Bargaining
Agreement, MLS (July 16, 2015, 5:17 PM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2015/07/16/mlsplayers-union-announces-it-has-ratified-collective-bargaining-agreement.
23
Id.
24
Daryl Grove, 10 Things You Need to Know about the New MLS CBA, PASTE (Mar. 5, 2015,
5:00 AM), https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/03/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-themls-cba.html.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Liviu Bird, MLS Player Involved in CBA Talks Says Many 'Upset,' 'Disappointed' with Deal,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/03/04/mls-cba-dealplayers-union/. Bob Foose is the MLS Players Union executive director.
29
Id.
30
Grove, supra note 24.
31
Nick Borriello, ESPN Survey of MLS Players Reveals Salary Frustrations, SBNATION (Mar.
22, 2016, 2:29 PM), https://www.sounderatheart.com/2016/3/22/11286104/espn-survey-of-mlsplayers-reveals-salary-frustrations.
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also reflected “lingering feelings of bitterness left over from a long and
protracted battle over a new [CBA] prior to the 2015 season.”32 Furthermore,
“[w]hen asked what one thing they would change about MLS, 44% of players
said the salaries.”33 Additionally, 66% of MLS players responded that they
would leave for Europe if they were given the chance.34
C. How the Single-Entity Structure Causes Many of MLS’s Problems
Regarding Player Compensation
As elaborated above, as a consequence of the failure of the NASL, the
developers of MLS thought such a risk-friendly structure would appeal to
investors, giving the League a greater chance of survival.35 However, many
of the current problems associated with MLS’s salary system are inherent to
MLS’s single-entity structure.
One such problem is that, under MLS’s single-entity structure, when a
player signs a deal, it is between the player and the League as a whole, rather
than between the player and any individual team.36 As a consequence of this
structure, teams do not compete with one another in signing players—players
simply go where the league assigns them.37 If the player desires otherwise,
then he is left with no other option except to leave the League. This current
state of limited movement for players is clearly unfair to the players, and is
unlike any of the other major American professional sports leagues.
Furthermore, choosing where to play is only one aspect of free agency,
and arguably not the most important one to the players. The more significant
objective of free agency “is the ability to negotiate a salary on the free
market.”38 If MLS had true free agency, a player would theoretically be free
to go to any club to look for a contract offer, and then use the leverage that his
ability to freely choose gives him to discuss more favorable terms with other
clubs until one team has won the player’s “signature with some combination
of the most attractive salary, most prominent role in the team, and best chance
to win.”39
However, as it stands now, the League has already restricted every free
agent salary negotiation.40 Under MLS’s abrogated version of free agency,
the League has mandated that “each of their franchises will only have to pay

32

See id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Heike K. Sullivan, Comment: Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS’s Single-Entity
Structure is a “Sham”, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2000).
36
Billy Haisley, MLS Players and Owners Agree to Keep League Mired in Mediocrity,
DEADSPIN (Mar. 05, 2015, 2:35pm), https://deadspin.com/mls-players-and-owners-agree-to-keepleague-mired-in-me-1689634743.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
33
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at most 125% of a player’s previous salary.”41 This free agency structure
thereby anchors a player’s options for negotiation to his last contract, while
failing to fully account for how much that player has improved since that
player’s last contract.42
Additionally, because the League is a single entity, League officials have
the entirely inequitable power of having their subsidiaries, the teams, fully
restrict the movement and negotiation power of a player by commanding a
team to not offer the player a contract at all.43
In fact, the League has already shown that it is not above using this
central-planning power to orchestrate player movement.44
Further, the
League’s restriction of player movement is not even limited to players within
the MLS.45 For example, in 2012, the League stopped sought-after defender
Olof Mellberg from transferring to Toronto F.C. from his club in Greece.46 It
was suspected that the League blocked his transfer because, as a
Scandinavian, Mellberg appealed to none of the sizable ethnic minorities the
League covets as fans.47
While the Toronto players and fans were
understandably furious, the League, as a single entity, is entitled to
“manipulate its incoming contracts to place certain players in specific
cities.”48
When the League meddles with the competitive landscape, it is the fans
as well as the League itself that lose. While the League maneuvers in such a
way as to ostensibly keep the competitive balance even amongst every team
to keep fan interest, commentators and fans cannot help but feel that the
League favors the larger market teams, like Los Angeles and New York, given
those larger-market teams are often seen to be less hampered by such
maneuvers.49 This perceived favoritism may or may not be true, but the everpresent specter of League meddling undoubtedly turns off many long-term
and potential fans. For a league that is in its relative infancy and still needs
41
Id.; see also Paul Tenorio, MLS and players reach deal, avoid strike; Orlando City season to
begin on time, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/os-mlsplayers-avoid-strike-orlando-city-20150304-post.html.
42
See Haisley, supra note 36.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., Cathal Kelley, Toronto FC’s Hands Tied by Meddling MLS: Kelly, THE STAR (Oct.
28, 2012),
https://www.thestar.com/sports/soccer/tfc/2012/10/28/toronto_fcs_hands_tied_by_meddling_mls_ke
lly.html; See also Grant Wahl, How Seattle's Stunning Clint Dempsey Deal Got Done, SI (Aug. 5,
2013), https://www.si.com/soccer/2013/08/05/clint-dempsey-seattle-sounders-mls; Barry Petchesky,
How MLS Made Sure Clint Dempsey Landed in Seattle, DEADSPIN (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:21PM),
https://deadspin.com/how-mls-made-sure-clint-dempsey-landed-in-seattle-1030615076 (detailing
another example of the League meddling with player transfers).
45
See Kelley, supra note 44.
46
See id.
47
Id.
48
Petchesky, supra note 44.
49
See Kelley, supra note 46; see also Luke O’ Brien, MLS Salaries Make No Secret of MLS
Plan to Create NY-LA Rivalry, DEADSPIN (May 9, 2011, 2:55PM),
https://deadspin.com/5800045/mls-salaries-make-no-secret-of-mls-plan-to-create-ny-la-rivalry.
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more fans and viewers, such a public perception can be extremely harmful to
the League’s growth.
Nevertheless, the single-entity structure is here to stay for the
foreseeable and indefinite future. In Fraser v. Major League Soccer, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the League’s single-entity
structure.50
Therefore, this article will necessarily advocate for the
implementation of a salary arbitration system within the confines of the
League’s single-entity structure.
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SALARY ARBITRATION MODELS
OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, AND AN ARGUMENT FOR
IMPLEMENTING BENEFICIAL MECHANISMS OF IT
IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER

A. The MLB Salary Arbitration Model
Major League Baseball uses “final-offer” arbitration as its salary
arbitration system.51 Final-offer arbitration can be summarized as follows:
[P]layers are separated into three categories: (1) pre-arbitration players;
(2) players eligible for salary arbitration; and (3) free agents. These categories
are based on the player's service time (i.e., the number of years and days of
major league service a player has in their career). A team has the contractual
rights to a player until that player has six years of service time and becomes a
free agent. A pre-arbitration player will generally be a player who has less
than three years of service time while a player who has at least three, but less
than six years of service time will be eligible to enter the salary arbitration
process.52
According to the MLB, “Once a player becomes eligible for salary
arbitration, he is eligible each offseason (assuming he is tendered a contract)
until he reaches six years of Major League service.”53 It is at that point that a
player becomes eligible for free agency.54

50
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s
judgments in favor of the defendant (League) on the plaintiffs’ (the players) claims under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts against the single-entity structure).
51
Justin Sievert, Breaking Down the MLB Salary Arbitration Process, SPORTING NEWS (Jan.
12, 2018), http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb/news/mlb-salary-arbitration-process-breakdownspring-training-2016/4jkawqkczi8i17cb4rhqjxseh.
52
Id. Additionally, there is a special class of players, called “Super 2s”. A Super 2 is a player
who has between two and three years of service time, has at least 86 days of service time during the
second year, and ranks in the top 22 percent of players who fall into that classification. A Super 2
player will have three years as a pre-arbitration eligible player and four arbitration years while a
player who doesn't earn Super 2 status will have three years of salary arbitration following their four
pre-arbitration year. Id. For simplicity, this note will not address how the Super 2 categorization
can be applied to MLS.
53
Salary Arbitration, MLB (Last Accessed Jan. 30, 2018 6:40 PM)
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/salary-arbitration.
54
Id.
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Procedurally, “teams must offer eligible players arbitration by December
12th, or else those players are non-tendered and released.”55 After that date,
“players and teams have until January 17th to reach an agreement, or else both
sides must submit their salary demands to an arbitration panel,”56 and the team
“and player must exchange salary figures for the upcoming season” by that
time as well.57 “Hearings are [then] conducted throughout the first few weeks
of February.”58 Moreover, in “the week prior to the exchange of arbitration
figures is when the vast majority of arbitration cases are avoided” as the player
agrees to a one or multi-year contract.59
Under the current MLB CBA, a three-arbitrator panel is used to arbitrate
salary disputes between a player and his team.60 The panel is handpicked by
the MLB Players Association (“MLBPA”) and the MLB Labor Relations
Department (“MLBLRD”).61 The MLBPA, which represents the player, and
MLBLRD, which represents the team, each put forth salary proposals that are
presented in a hearing before the panel.62 The panel then uses a wide-range
of criteria to determine which party’s proposal to accept.63
The criteria to be considered by the panel are:
[T]he quality of the Player's contribution to his Club during the past
season . . . the length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of
the Player's past compensation, comparative baseball salaries . . . the existence
of any physical or mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent
performance record of the Club including but not limited to its League
standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance.64
The parties may submit any evidence relevant to those criteria, and the
arbitration panel weighs the evidence under the circumstances.65
After hearing arguments from both sides, the panel selects the salary
figure of either the player or the club (and only selects one of the two figures)
as the player's salary for the upcoming season.66

55
Salary Arbitration, FANGRAPHS https://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/mlb-salaryarbitration-rules/ (last updated Jan. 30, 2018 3:23 AM).
56
Id.
57
Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53.
58
Salary Arbitration, supra note 55.
59
Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53 (noting also that “[m]ulti-year deals, in these
instances, serve as a means to avoid arbitration for each season that is covered under the new
contract.”).
60
2017–2021 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VI, § E(5),
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf.
61
Id.
62
Id. at § E(4).
63
Quiles, supra note 7, at 269.
64
Id. (including factors for player performance such as special qualities of leadership and
public appeal).
65
Id.
66
Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53.
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B. The Beneficial Mechanisms of the MLB Salary Arbitration Model that
Should be Implemented in MLS
There are benefits to both the players and teams conferred by the MLB’s
salary arbitration system.67 During the first three years of service, a prearbitration eligible player will typically make somewhere around the league
minimum salary.68 However, after those three years, the player accrues
enough service time to be eligible for salary arbitration.69 This is a benefit for
the player because that player now has some leverage to earn a salary that is
at least commensurate with that player's past performance.70 For an example
of how valuable this leverage can be, Chris Carter of the Houston Astros
entered salary arbitration eligibility in 2015.71 In 2014 his salary was
$510,000.72 He signed a deal in 2015 in which the team agreed (at least in
part) to avoid a salary arbitration hearing.73 The new deal was worth
$4,175,000, which was an increase of 719% from his salary the year prior.74
Still, salary arbitration is also a benefit for the owners because, although
the player will receive a salary increase, the player will still likely earn a salary
lower than their true value on the free agent market.75 It should also be noted,
there is evidence that MLB’s salary arbitration model seems to slightly favor
the owner’s side once the arbitration hearing is initiated.76 From 1974 to 2015,
the owners had won 57.66% of arbitration hearings.77
Considering the benefits that MLB’s method of conferring arbitration
eligibility after three years yields, MLS can viably implement a system
wherein arbitration eligibility is also gained after a set number of years. Given
that the careers of MLB and MLS players are relatively similar in length,78 a
67

Quiles, supra note 7, at 270.
Details of MLB, MLBPA Labor Agreement, MLB (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/210125462/details-of-mlb-mlbpa-labor-agreement/. In 2017, the
minimum salary in MLB was $535,000 for the year. Id.
69
Sievert, supra note 51.
70
Id.
71
Maury Brown, Who's Winning the MLB Salary Arbitration Game? Here's Data from 1974 to
2015, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:10 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/02/23/whos-winning-the-mlb-salary-arbitrationgame-heres-data-from-1974-to-2015/#551be4eb1558.
72
Id.
73
See id.
74
Id.
75
Sievert, supra note 51. “This is important for the team because the team will either save
money, or it can use the savings on other players.” Id.
76
Brown, supra note 71, at 2.
77
Id.
78
The average length of a MLB player career is 5.6 years. Average Major League Baseball
Career 5.6 Years, Says New Study, SCI. DAILY (July 11, 2007)
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/07/070709131254.htm. It should be noted, however,
that the average length of an MLS player’s career is only 2.5 seasons; however, “If a MLS player
makes it past the third year, chances are good for a relatively long MLS career.” A Demographic
Analysis of MLS Players, SOCCERMETRICS (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.soccermetrics.net/paper68
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straight adoption of MLB’s method of conferring arbitration after an accrual
of three years seems practical.
Moreover, the procedures of MLB’s arbitration system encourage a party
to submit a sufficiently reasonable offer so that an arbitrator will be persuaded
to select it.79 It has been argued that negotiations thereby progress more
smoothly because the difference between the two offers is not too large.80 The
tendering of reasonable offers is likely the reason why such a small percentage
of the cases filed ever make it to an arbitration hearing.81
The MLB system’s use of a panel is also beneficial. Panels help create
improved dialogue and an opportunity to study the market together and reach
a group consensus.82 Thus, an adoption of this mechanism by MLS would
likely also be a positive step forward.
Furthermore, the criteria considered by the MLB, outlined above, should
be applied to MLS because it is a reasonable and ostensibly impartial method
of coming to a salary figure that is commensurate with the player’s past
performance. In contrast to the current method, this method of application
would not be left entirely to the League’s determination of the player’s
value.83 Therefore, an adoption of MLB’s method of looking at criteria is
preferable to the capricious system that MLS currently uses.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SALARY ARBITRATION MODEL OF THE
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, AND AN ARGUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING
BENEFICIAL MECHANISMS OF IT IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER
A. The NHL Salary Arbitration Model
In the NHL’s salary arbitration system, most players must accrue four
years of NHL experience before they are eligible for salary arbitration.84 In
addition, the NHL’s CBA specifies the number of games a player must play

discussions/demographic-analysis-of-mls-players-boyden-carey (summarizing Nathaniel Boyden
and James Carey, From One-and-Done to Seasoned Veterans: A Demographic Analysis of
Individual Career Length in Major League Soccer, JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN
SPORTS, 6(4): Article 5, 2010).
79
Aubut, supra note 1, at 236.
80
See id. (commenting further that the offers are not as large as in the NHL, where both parties
tend to take extreme positions to leave room for the arbitrator to decide on a figure somewhere in the
middle).
81
Id.
82
See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 37 (arguing, in the context of the NBA, that a two-member
panel would be even more advantageous because it would “help avoid the phenomena of arbitrators
strategically not siding with one party too often and of ‘groupthink’ that seems to happen
occasionally in a three-person panel in baseball.”).
83
See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 26.
84
Jamie Fitzpatrick, NHL Salary Arbitration Explained, THOUGHTCO (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://www.thoughtco.com/nhl-salary-arbitration-explained-2778981. The term is reduced for those
who signed their first NHL contract after the age of twenty. Id.
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in a particular season in order to constitute a year of accrued professional
experience.85 According to the CBA:
A player aged 18 or 19 earns a year of professional experience
by playing ten (10) or more NHL Games in a given season. A
player aged 20 or older (or who turns 20 between September
16 and December 31 of the calendar year in which he signs his
first standard player contract) earns a year of professional
experience by playing ten (10) or more Professional Games
under a standard player contract in a given season.86
Unlike the MLB system, only restricted free agents are allowed to utilize
the salary arbitration process.87 Under the CBA, teams retain certain rights
regarding restricted free agents, even after the term of their contract has
expired.88 A valuable right for the team is the right to prevent the player from
signing with any other club.89 The NHL’s system is meant to allow the player
to achieve their market value while also preserving the rights of the club.90
Procedurally, the NHL system is rather complicated and detailed. The
deadline for players to request salary arbitration each year is July 5, with cases
heard in late July and early August.91 Oftentimes, players and teams will
continue to negotiate up until the date of the hearing in order to come to an
agreement on a contract and avoid the arbitration process.92
Both the player (or the NHL Players’ Association (“NHLPA”)) and the
team must submit briefs to the salary arbitrator and each other at least fortyeight hours before the hearing begins.93 The hearing is conducted by one
neutral arbitrator.94 The arbitrator is randomly selected from a pool of eight
arbitrators, who are all members of the National Academy of Arbitrators and
are chosen jointly by the NHL and the NHLPA.95 At the hearing, each side,
the NHLPA/player and the NHL team, gets ninety minutes to state its case. 96
These ninety minutes will normally include rebuttals to the presentation of

85
Ryan Lake, How Salary Arbitration Works in the National Hockey League (NHL),
LAWINSPORT (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.lawinsport.com/blog/ryan-lake-blog/item/how-salaryarbitration-works-in-the-national-hockey-league-nhl.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Fitzpatrick, supra note 84.
92
Id.
93
See Dan Ryan, Spooner vs. the Bruins: How Does NHL Arbitration Work?, SBNATION (July
25, 2016), https://www.stanleycupofchowder.com/2017/7/25/16023102/ryan-spooner-arbitrationhearing-how-does-nhl-arbitration-work-nhl-average-salary-arbitration-rights; Aubut, supra note 1, at
204.
94
Aubut, supra note 1, at 203.
95
Id. at 203–04.
96
Ryan, supra note 93.
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argument and comparisons of players from the opposing party.97 In the NHL
system, the arbitrator is permitted to play an active role during the hearing.98
The arbitrator has discretion to call witnesses and request documents
necessary for a fair resolution of the dispute.99
Per the current NHL CBA, there is a multitude of evidence the sides are
able to present, including: the player’s overall performance, the player’s
National Hockey League official statistics, the number of games that the
player has played, his past injuries or illnesses, the player’s length of service
in the league and with the team, the player’s overall contribution to the success
or failure of his team in past seasons, any particular evidence of leadership or
public appeal in keeping with his responsibilities as a team member, the
overall performance in past seasons of any players who may be comparable
to the player whose salary is in dispute, and the compensation of any players
who are alleged to be comparable to the player at issue.100 Additionally, the
arbitrator is not bound by evidentiary rules, which allows the arbitrator to
freely weigh each piece of evidence.101
The arbitrator’s decision must be made within forty-eight hours of the
hearing.102 The decision includes the duration of the contract, the yearly
salary, any minor league clauses, and a brief explanation.103
Overall, this salary arbitration system also confers benefits to both players
and teams. Like the MLB system, the NHL arbitration system provides a
crucial bargaining option for players facing restricted free agency.104 Another
benefit for the player is that there are no limitations on the number of times a
player can ask for arbitration and the sum of the salary awarded.105
The NHL’s system also allows teams to ask for salary arbitration.106
However, players may only participate in arbitration once during their career,
and their salaries can never be reduced by more than 15% of the previous
year.107
When the arbitrator’s decision is announced, the team has the right to
"walk away" from the award, unless it is the party that filed the arbitration
hearing.108 Nevertheless, “[i]f the team exercises this right, the player can
declare himself an unrestricted free agent.”109
97

Id.
Aubut, supra note 1, at 204.
99
Id.
100
Ryan, supra note 93. There is also a number of items of evidence that cannot be used:
contracts signed by players who were not restricted free agents, any previous negotiations between
the player and the team, news reports or press briefings, and the financial condition of the team. Id.
101
Aubut, supra note 1, at 204.
102
Fitzpatrick, supra note 84.
103
Ryan, supra note 93.
104
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 84.
105
Id.
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Id.
107
Id.
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Id.; Ryan, supra note 93.
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Fitzpatrick, supra note 84.
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B. The Beneficial Mechanisms of the NHL Salary Arbitration Model that
Should be Implemented in MLS
There are many mechanisms of the NHL salary arbitration model that can
be used effectively in the framework of MLS. For example, in the NHL, the
arbitrator can award a salary consistent with either of the two offers made by
the parties or for an amount ranging anywhere in between the two offers.110
The NHL system enables the arbitrator to hear both parties' points of view and
is, thereby, able to come to areasonable compromise: taking into account the
specific circumstances surrounding a player.111 This would allow an arbitrator
flexibility when players and the League have greatly disparate salary
proposals. Adoption of this mechanism would thus be a positive decision for
MLS.
Moreover, the NHL system’s method of exchanging salary figures
between the team and player is a highly valuable mechanism. Beginning in
the 1990s, NHL players' salaries began to rise dramatically.112 Commentators
have asserted that the exchange of salary figures between player and team
representatives is a factor explaining the jump in salaries.113 Before the salary
arbitration system was implemented, it was more difficult for agents to
surmise if the salary they were seeking for their client was too high or too low
in relation to that player’s market value.114 Due to the increased transparency
in information exchange, agents now have this valuable information to use as
leverage when negotiating their client's salary.115 Clearly, MLS would do well
to emulate the NHL’s information exchange mechanism if it wants its players
to become more satisfied with their salaries.
For the benefit of the owners, another mechanism MLS can borrow is
NHL teams’ "walk-away rights."116 An NHL team has the right to reject the
arbitrator's award and refuse to bind itself to the decision, which allows the
player to either become an unrestricted free agent or accept the last offer that
was on the table by the team before the hearing.117 This mechanism would
first alleviate any potential issues the League may have with subjecting itself
to binding arbitration regarding salaries. Secondly, this aspect would allow
for players, by becoming unrestricted free agents, to have even more
autonomy in pursuing salaries that are commensurate with their market value.

110

Bukstein, supra note 7, at 50.
Aubut, supra note 1, at 236.
112
Id. at 223.
113
Id
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. 12.
117
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. 12.
111
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IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATING MLB AND
NHL SALARY MODELS
A. The Potential Reticence of the Owners
Owners may see expanded free agency and salary arbitration as a threat
to the League’s structure because it would set the members within the single
entity of MLS in opposition to each other.118 This would be especially bad
for the League because such negotiations would make the League look less
like a synchronized organization in the eyes of the law, which could make it
susceptible to antitrust lawsuits.119
In fact, the League has been attacked on antitrust grounds before.120 A
change that could bring the League in front of a court again could be argued
by the owners to be against MLS’s overall interest. Furthermore, any change
that could once again create an adversarial relationship between the League
and the players will undoubtedly be unwelcome in the owners’ eyes.
Nevertheless, the reality is that a high number of players are already
dissatisfied with the current state of MLS’s compensation structure, and there
is already some hostility from the players toward the owners.121 Thus, a salary
arbitration system structured with the reasonable mechanisms detailed above
represents a palatable method by which salary disputes can be effectively and
congenially settled.122
B. The Difficulties of Instituting Salary Arbitration under a Salary Cap
MLS imposes a salary cap every year that all teams' total payroll cannot
exceed.123 Every year the salary cap rises by a specified amount.124 The
118

Haisley, supra note 36.
Id.
120
See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). In this instance, the League prevailed when the
First Circuit held that there was no liability under 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1, 2, 18 because the formation of
the soccer association did not involve the acquisition or merger of existing business enterprises, but
rather the formation of an entirely new entity which itself represented the creation of an entirely new
market. Id.
121
See Borriello, supra note 31; see also Taylor Anderson, MLS Players “Willing To Strike”
Over Free Agency?, SOUNDERS NATION (2015), https://soundersnation.com/2015/01/22/mlsplayers-willing-strike-free-agency/ (noting that “[t]he players are arguing that the league has never
been more popular, and that after a new broadcast deal with Fox Spots and ESPN, the league should
be able to not only institute free agency but increase the minimum salaries for its players, who are
currently some of the lowest paid professional soccer players in the world’s major leagues.”); Ty
Duffy, MLS Owners Offer Laughable "Free Agency" Proposal To Players, Almost Inviting a Strike,
THE BIG LEAD (March 3, 2015), http://thebiglead.com/2015/03/03/mls-owners-offer-laughable-freeagency-proposal-to-players-almost-inviting-a-strike/.
122
See 1 JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.09 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2017)
(“[A]rbitration has played a significant role in the resolution of a variety of disputes in the sports
industry. As a result, many of the major legal issues in the professional sports industry have been
resolved, not in the courtroom, but in the arbitrator’s office.”).
123
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Soccer and Major League Soccer
Players Union: February 1, 2015 – January 31, 2020.
124
Id.
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amounts are documented in the CBA for each year the CBA is in effect.125
Instituting a salary arbitration system in a league with a salary cap can pose a
number of challenges.126
First, the evidentiary rules of the NHL and MLB systems would need to
slightly be altered. In the NHL’s127 and MLB’s128 models of salary arbitration,
the information regarding the teams' and leagues’ finances is not
admissible.129 For those salary arbitration models to work in MLS, such
evidence would be necessary for arbitrators to ensure the team in arbitration
observes the League’s salary cap.130 While this would potentially limit the
sums that players can be awarded, it will cause players to be more selective
when submitting claims in arbitration.131 As a beneficial consequence, a
potential drawback in the League’s eyes may be cured. That is, the salary cap
would limit a player to pursue salary arbitration only when the club has
enough money to spend under the cap.132
Second, the salary cap would present the problem of how a team's
remaining cap room gets divided if more than one player on a team chooses
to pursue salary arbitration.133 Under the MLB and NHL salary arbitration
models, teammates are heard independently, which prevents arbitrators from
inappropriately comparing teammates with each other; this allows each player
an opportunity to be judged on his own merits.134 For the same reasons, and
in the same mold as those salary arbitration models, MLS players should
likewise have their claims heard independently.
VI. CONCLUSION
Major League Soccer's adoption of MLB's and NHL’s salary arbitration
system can benefit the players, the teams, and the League as a whole. MLS
Commissioner Don Garber has repeatedly stated publicly that he intends for
MLS to be a “top league” by 2022.135 However, the League’s publicly stated
goal is hampered by its business and development structure.136 MLS is
hampered because, as has been detailed above, the League keeps salaries

125

Id.
See Quiles, supra note 7, at 275.
127
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. 12.
128
MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement art. VI.
129
See Quiles, supra note 7, at 275.
130
Id. (coming to a similar solution on a similar problem).
131
See id.
132
See id.
133
See id.
134
MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement art. VI; NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement art.
126

12.
135
Noah Davis, MLS Has a 2022 Problem, VICE SPORTS (June 16, 2016, 7:44 AM),
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/wnmdw9/mls-has-a-2022-problem (writing that Garber has
made statements to the fact in 2011, 2013, and 2015).
136
Davis, supra note 135.
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artificially depressed in an effort to curb spending and limit losses.137 If MLS
wants to meet its goal of becoming a top league, like the English Premier
League for example, then MLS needs to compensate its players in a manner
similar to the top leagues.138
Instituting a non-biased forum to deal with salary disputes prior to the
season, MLS could more effectively compensate its players with salaries that
are commensurate with their skills and performance. This, in turn, should
place MLS on the path of elevating itself to the level of the world’s top
leagues. Higher salaries mean that MLS would attract better talent from
around the world.
Furthermore, salary arbitration not only represents a pathway for the
League to attract better talent, it also represents a way for teams to keep the
talent they already have. Take, for example, the salary dispute between
Hungarian attacker Krisztian Nemeth and Sporting Kansas City.139 Nemeth
scored 10 goals in 28 appearances, and was one of Sporting’s most effective
players.140 “[Nemeth’s] original contract was for four seasons, meaning he
still had three years left on a deal that [would pay] him $250,000.”141
However, Nemeth saw that he had out-performed the value of his contract and
he accordingly asked the club for a raise in salary.142 Unfortunately, the two
sides could not come to an agreement.143 According to Sporting, “Nemeth’s
asking price was just too high,” and the team could not afford to meet his
salary demands.144 Unwilling to give Nemeth a raise, and without an
arbitration mechanism, Sporting saw itself left only with the unpalatable
option of selling the valuable twenty-seven year-old to Al-Gharafa of the
Qatari league.145 This example is just one of many where a salary arbitration
system could have possibly represented an avenue for a team to retain valuable
talent. Further, the League would have correspondingly benefited by keeping
a player of Nemeth’s caliber.
MLS’s current structure of player compensation harms the individual
players, clubs, owners, fans, and even the League in the long run. A salary
arbitration system incorporating the most beneficial mechanisms of MLB and
the NHL represents a definite way to rectify the challenging problem of
inequitable player compensation.
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Id.
See id. (“The average salary for a player at Chelsea – the club with the seventh-highest
average salary – is $7.46 million,” which is “nearly half a million more than Kaká, MLS's highest
paid player.”).
139
Jason Davis, The Problem with MLS on a Budget, UNITED STATES NATIONAL SOCCER
TEAM PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (Feb. 13, 2016), https://ussoccerplayers.com/2016/02/the-problemwith-mls-on-a-budget-transfers-soccer-business.html.
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